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ABSTRACT 
Up to 80% of each private rural property in the Brazilian Amazon is protected by law 
through the Legal Reserve (LR) mechanism of the federal Forest Code, underlining the 
conservation importance of forests on private lands in one of the world´s most important 
biomes. However, our understanding of the discrepancies in levels of forest protection 
on private lands as obligated by the law versus what occurs in practice remains very 
poor. We assessed patterns of forest cover and legal compliance with the Forest Code in 
the 1.25 Mkm
2
 Brazilian state of Pará, which has the highest deforestation rate in the 
Amazon. We evaluate the LR deficit and surplus patterns for different sized properties 
and across 144 municipalities, and found that the total LR surplus (12.6 Mha) was more 
than five times the total area of deficit (2.3 Mha). Yet, from the total surplus, only 11% 
can be legally deforested while the remaining 89% is already protected by law but can 
be used (sold or rented) to compensate for areas that are under deficit. Medium and 
large-scale properties make up most of the total LR deficit area, while agrarian reform 
settlements had comparatively large amounts of both compensation-only surplus and 
deforestable surplus. Most of the municipalities (77%) in the state could compensate 
their total deficit with surplus areas of LR in the same municipality, while the remainder 
can be compensate their deficit in one or more neighboring municipality, indicating 
compensation can always take place close to the source of the deficit. Maximising the 
environmental benefits of achieving Forest Code compliance requires measures that go 
beyond the existing legal framework, including interventions to avoid further 
deforestation in places where it is still legal, compensate in close proximity to areas 
with legal reserve deficit and promote local restoration on degraded lands. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Native vegetation covers about 60% of the national territory of Brazil, with 40% 
under some form of public protected area (conservation units and indigenous lands) and 
the remaining 60% located in private areas or public lands with no clear designation 
(Ferreira et al., 2012; Soares-Filho, 2013). The protection of forests on private land is 
therefore a vital part of any overall conservation strategy, helping sustain the delivery of 
critical ecosystem services, including maintenance of hydrological cycles, water quality, 
climate regulation through carbon sequestration and storage and the conservation of 
biodiversity (Daily et al., 1997; Nasi et al., 2002; Grimaldi et al., 2014). 
In Brazil, the conservation of forest on private lands is regulated by the Brazilian 
Environmental Law (Law N° 12.651, 25 March 2012) (Brazilian Federal Government, 
2012b), commonly known as the Forest Code.  This regulation divides rural properties 
into two areas: land for production and land dedicated to conservation and the 
sustainable management of natural resources. The latter is divided into two further 
categories: (i) permanent preservation areas (APP, in Portuguese) to protect particularly 
sensitive areas such as riparian vegetation, springs, steep slopes (>45°) and hilltops, 
where only low impact activities, such as ecotourism, are allowed; and (ii) Legal 
Reserves (LR) to promote the sustainable use of natural resources and the conservation 
of biodiversity. Economic activities, such as forest management for selective logging, 
are permitted in LRs under license but deforestation is not allowed. According to the 
updated Forest Code, last revised in October 2012, the definition of the LR area in a 
rural property is based on the Brazilian region where the property is located (e.g. LR is 
up to 80% in the Legal Amazon but only 20% in the other regions), the type of native 
vegetation (forest or savanna), the size of the property, region-specific regulations 
where LR reductions are allowed (e.g. areas that are zoned for agricultural development 
under state zoning plans) and the timing of deforestation (Brazilian Federal 
Government, 2012b).  
Once the required LR area has been defined for each rural property, it is possible 
to estimate both the LR deficit, which is the shortfall of forest cover that is required to 
comply with the law, and the potential surplus, which is the forest cover additional to 
that required by law, expressed as a percentage of the total property area. The total 
surplus can also be disaggregated into that which is in excess of the LR requirement but 
which nevertheless cannot be deforested, yet can be used to compensate properties that 
are in deficit (termed here compensation-only surplus), and that which is in excess of 
the LR requirement but which can legally be deforested (i.e. for the Amazon biome 
areas of forest that are in excess of 80% of each property area, termed here deforestable 
surplus) (Figure 2). This distinction is of critical importance as the deforestable surplus 
is the only surplus that offers genuinely additional benefits for forest conservation (i.e. it 
is at risk of being cleared if not used to compensate properties with a LR deficit), whilst 
the compensation-only surplus is an important mechanism for providing monetary 
compensation to law-abiding landowners who did not deforest in the past.  
In order to offset the LR deficit, the updated Forest Code provides two 
possibilities: forest restoration within the same farm that has the deficit, or 
compensation of LR deficit by acquiring, either by rent or purchase, the surplus of 
properties elsewhere. With the exception of APP areas this means that landowners can 
maintain their LR outside the boundaries of the farm that is in deficit without needing to 
retire land from production for restoration purposes. Trading for LR compensation can 
occur through mechanisms such as Environmental Reserve Quotas (CRA) and 
conservation easements (Brazilian Federal Government, 2012b; Zakia and Pinto, 2013), 
with an increasing number of initiatives seeking to facilitate such exchanges (such as 
the online legal reserve market place offered by Bolsa Verde Rio: www.bvrio.org).   
However, land tenure uncertainties, e.g. land ownership rights and location of 
properties, make it difficult to conduct an accurate assessment of land cover in rural 
properties or implement environmental legislation effectively (Barreto et al., 2008; 
Brito and Barreto, 2011). To address this, the Brazilian government created the 
Environmental Rural Property Register (CAR, in Portuguese, first introduced in the 
state of Pará in 2006), a mandatory georeferenced register of private properties, that has 
been instrumental in helping to both assess and promote compliance with environmental 
regulations, curb deforestation and foster more effective economic and environmental 
planning. The updated Forest Code states that by the 5
th
 of May 2016, all rural 
properties in the country must be registered in CAR (Brazilian Federal Government, 
2012b, 2012a).  
Despite Brazil having some of the world´s most stringent environmental 
regulations for the legal protection of native vegetation in private properties, the extent 
of private reserve surpluses and deficits has hitherto been very poorly assessed, and 
never at the scale of an entire state. Although Soares-Filho et al. (2014) assessed 
compliance with the Forest Code at the scale of the entire country, a lack of data on 
property boundaries meant that they used micro-catchments as their unit of analysis. 
The lack of more detailed assessments can be explained by: (i) the historic lack of a 
minimally accurate and representative georeferenced register of private properties for 
any Brazilian state – a task further hampered by insufficient technical expertise within 
state governments to validate CARs declared by property owners themselves; (ii) a lack 
of detailed and reliable Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and remote sensing 
products, especially for the Amazon region – including water course mapping at a 
1:50.000 scale as required by law (Souza Jr. et al., 2013) and land cover maps with a 
resolution consistent with the scale of individual properties; and (iii) the complexity of 
Brazilian environmental laws that have led to uncertainty, misunderstandings and 
controversies among different sectors (e.g. government, NGOs and farmers) on how to 
apply regulations and estimate legal liabilities (Ellinger and Barreto, 2012; Vale et al., 
2014; Vieira et al., 2014). Taken together, these barriers have undermined effective law 
enforcement, compliance monitoring and more sustainable land-use planning of private 
properties. 
Here we estimate the total LR deficit and surplus for the state of Pará, which 
covers around 25% of the Brazilian Amazon, and compare levels among different sized 
properties and across 144 municipalities. We focus on Pará, the second largest state in 
Brazil, because: (i) it is the most advanced state in the Amazon in registering its private 
rural properties in the CAR system; > 60% of the area suitable for registry was included 
in the state government database by 2014; (ii) it currently has one of the highest rates of 
deforestation in the Amazon: an average of 2,000 km
2
/year from 2011 to 2015, 
compared to 5,500 km
2
/year for the whole Brazilian Amazon, and (iii) state and 
municipal governments of Pará, together with civil society, have been particularly 
active in their efforts, to reduce deforestation and the state has been recognized as 
setting an example for other parts of the Amazon, eg. through Para´s Green County 
initiative. We address four specific questions: (i) What is the LR deficit and surplus for 
the entire state of Pará?; (ii) What proportion of the total surplus can be considered 
deforestable versus compensation-only surplus? (iii) How is the total deficit and surplus 
for the state distributed across properties of different sizes?; and (iv) What is the 




2.1. Study area 
Our analysis is focused on the state of Pará, located in the eastern Brazilian 
Amazon (Figure 1). Pará is the second largest state in Brazil, larger than many countries 
(e.g. Peru, South Africa) and intersects five of the key areas of endemism in the 
Amazon. It has an estimated population of 8 million people, with an area of 1.25 million 
km
2
, encompassing 144 municipalities and with a Gross Domestic Product of R$ 88.3 
billion (IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2014), mostly from the 
extractive industry (e.g. iron, bauxite, wood, charcoal), agriculture (e.g. palm oil and 
cassava) and cattle ranching (Pará has the fifth largest cattle herd in Brazil – with 17 
million heads in the 2013 census) (IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics, 2013).  
Pará has about 55% of its territory, or 685,575 km
2
, protected by law in 
sustainable-use, strictly protected, or indigenous reserves (Brazilian Ministry of the 
Environment and National Indian Foundation, 2013). However, it also had one of the 
highest rates of deforestation in the Amazon, which is related to the pattern of recent 
occupation and agricultural expansion incentivized by the construction of highways, the 
development of large-scale industries, such as energy and mining, and the expansion of 
agriculture and cattle ranching (Whately and Campanili, 2013). In response to this, the 
Federal government launched a major program in 2004 to combat deforestation in the 
Amazon, the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of the Legal Amazon 
Deforestation (PPCDAm in Portuguese), which encompassed a set of command, control 
and monitoring measures, as well as large-scale reserve expansion. These measures 
helped reduce deforestation across the biome by more than 80% from 2004 to 2012 
(MMA - Brazilian Ministry of the Environment, 2004; Whately and Campanili, 2013). 
In this context, the State Government of Pará also launched the Green Municipalities 
Program in 2011 in partnership with municipalities, civil society, private initiatives and 
the Public Prosecution Service.  
One of the main goals of the Green Municipalities Program is to control 
deforestation by increasing the property area registered under the CAR system. 
According to the program, Pará had more than 60% of its private land registered in the 
CAR system by 2014 (Green Municipalities Program, 2014). However, the tenure 
situation of private land across Pará remains in a confused state, with 39% of the 
territory - mainly the eastern portion - presenting tenure irregularities. The remaining 
61% that has defined tenure includes protected areas, agrarian reform settlements and 
registered properties.  
 
Figure 1: Study area, state of Pará, located in the Brazilian Amazon, northern Brazil. 
 
2.2. Accounting for Legal Reserve deficit and surplus 
We analyzed approximately 57,890 properties registered in the CAR system and 
945 agrarian reform settlements (set of small rural properties created by the Rural 
Settlement and Agrarian Reform – INCRA – for low income families), amounting to 
58,835 registered areas. We excluded all protected areas from this analysis as our focus 
is on compliance in private lands. Estimating LR deficit and surplus in Pará required us 
to reduce the overlap between geographic databases, define the LR percentage for each 
property, and estimate LR deficit and different types of surplus for each property 
(Figure 2). We then used this to estimate the LR balance across the state of Pará and 
within all municipalities based on the Brazilian Forest Code regulations. These 
analytical steps are summarized in Figure 3, and described in detail below. 
 Figure 2: Examples of LR deficit and different types of surplus per private property 
based on the updated Forest Code definitions: a) deforestable surplus for both 
medium/large properties located where LR reduction is not allowed. The minimum LR 
permitted is 80% of each property and only areas of forest in excess of this percentage 
can be deforested; b) compensation-only surplus and deforestable surplus for 
medium/large properties located in situations where LR reduction is allowed. Forest 
cover from 50%-80% cannot be deforested but can be used for compensation in 
medium/large properties and forest cover above 80% can be deforested; c) LR deficit 
where LR reduction is allowed.  The land owner must restore forest up to 50% of the 
property; d) deficit (deforestation after 2008) and compensation-only surplus for 
medium/large properties located in situations where LR reduction is allowed; e) 
compensation-only surplus and total surplus for medium/large properties where 
reduction is allowed; f) compensation-only surplus for small properties that is the same 
as the LR and g) deficit (deforestation after 2008) and compensation-only surplus for 
small properties which again is the same as the LR. 
 
 Figure 3: Summary of the methodology applied to estimate deficit and surplus of Legal 
Reserve in private properties in the state of Pará. The definition of the Legal Reserve 
percentage was based on four main criteria: (a) reduction of up to 50% for properties 
located in specific regions; (b) LR for properties up to 4 fiscal modules (FM) and 
settlements; (c) LR of 35% or 20% for non-forest vegetation areas (cerrado and 
grassland, respectively) and (d) LR of 80% for all properties where the other specific 
rules do not apply. LR stands for Legal Reserve; CAR - Environmental Rural Property 
Register; CU – Conservation Units; IL – Indigenous Land and ZEE - Ecological and 
Economic Zoning plan. 
 
2.2.1. Reducing overlap between properties registered in CAR 
The property database used in this study is restricted to the areas that can be 
registered in CAR, and therefore excludes indigenous lands, conservation units (except 
Areas of Environmental Preservation – APA, in Portuguese, where production land-uses 
are permitted), military lands and water bodies. The first phase of registering a private 
property in the CAR system involves contributing to a temporary registration (called a 
“provisional CAR”) that is then validated by the state government (when it then 
becomes a “definitive CAR”). However, due to the lack of technical capacity and 
accurate base maps, only a small portion (1%) of the CARs for the state of Pará, and the 
country more generally, have been validated (State Environmental Secretary, 2015). As 
a result there are a large number of errors and disputes over farm boundaries. Reducing 
the overlap between rural properties in the temporary CAR was therefore the first step 
towards obtaining more precise information regarding the Legal Reserve deficit and 
surplus for the state. We estimated an initial total overlap of 6.8 Mha, that is, 24% of the 
total area that is registered under the CAR. To reduce the area of overlap in farm 
boundaries we adopted the following criteria: 
 a) Where properties have the same CAR code, the most recent entry was 
considered because there may be more than one version of the same property in the 
database; 
 b) Where there was an overlap greater than 5% between an approved CAR and a 
provisional CAR issued before the former's approval, the property with the provisional 
CAR was excluded; No properties were excluded where the overlap was less than 5% 
(allowed by law);  
 c) Where overlap was greater than 80%, the smallest property was excluded; 
 d) Where properties were obviously duplicated in the system (i.e. they occupied 
exactly the same area and had exactly the same size), one of them was excluded at 
random; 
 e) Properties with an overlap larger than 30% with agrarian reform settlements 
were excluded; 
 f) Properties that overlapped more than 50% with water bodies were excluded, in 
addition to those that were located more than 50% in areas not suitable for registry 
(areas where CAR is not permitted). For example, properties located in Indigenous 
lands. 
These criteria were combined into an algorithm developed in ArcGIS Python 2.7 
and, after being applied to the CAR database, the overlap decreased to 667,000 ha - a 
reduction of 90% (6 Mha) compared to the initial total overlap.  
 
2.2.2. Defining Legal Reserve according to the updated Brazilian Forest 
Code 
A set of regulations present in the Brazilian Forest Code define the percentage of 
LR in rural properties (Figure 2 and 3; see Tables S2 and S3 for a summary). In general, 
rural properties with forest areas located in the Brazilian Amazon must have a LR of 
80% of each property's total area. However, there are several conditions that allow 
reduction of this initial percentage for forest restoration or compensation purposes (not 
deforestation) (Table S3). It means that the only portion that can be deforested is that in 
excess of 80% forest cover in a given property. However, properties that deforested 
more than 50% in the past must restore or compensate back up to 50%, not 80%. The 
rules applied to define LR were:  
 a) Areas with a possible reduction of up to 50% of the Legal Reserve in the 
property area: according to Art. 12, § 4, the minimum LR requirement can be reduced 
from 80 down to a minimum of 50% of each property area (for restoration purposes) 
when the municipality in which the property is located has more than 50% of its area 
protected by public Conservation Units (CUs, excluding APAs that may be occupied by 
private lands) and/or Indigenous Lands (ILs) (Fig. S1).  The LR can also be reduced 
down to a minimum of 50% of the area of each property (exclusively for regularization 
whether through on-farm restoration or off-farm compensation) when properties are 
located in areas designated for agricultural activities, and as indicated in the Ecological 
and Economic Zoning plan of the State (Art. 13, I). In order to comply with this 
regulation, we distinguished whether properties were located within the consolidated 
areas of the Ecological and Economic Zoning plan developed by the state 
Environmental Secretary (SEMAS-PA), excluding water resource areas, and identifying 
consolidated areas (areas deforested before 22nd July 2008) inside this zone. 
 b) Legal Reserve for properties smaller than four fiscal modules on 22nd July 
2008: A Fiscal Module (FM) is a Brazilian government agrarian measurement that 
represents the minimum area of an economically feasible rural property. One Fiscal 
Module ranges from 5 to 110 ha, depending on the municipality (Landau et al., 2012). 
For rural properties that have an area of up to four fiscal modules on 22nd July 2008 the 
LR is defined as the area under native vegetation as of 22nd July 2008 (Art. 67), thereby 
providing an amnesty for many smallholders who would otherwise have to restore or 
compensate for historical deforestation (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). In this case we 
selected current properties with up to four fiscal modules, since there is no CAR data 
for 2008, and compared them with the current forest cover to verify the percentage of 
native vegetation for each property. Those with deficits were then crossed with the 
forest cover of 2008 to determine the properties current LR requirement. The same 
criteria were used for rural settlements as they are largely dominated by small holdings 
of standard size.  
 c) Legal Reserve for vegetation other than forest: according to Art. 12, item I, 
cerrado vegetation and grassland areas in the Brazilian Amazon have a LR requirement 
of 35% and 20%, respectively, of the total property area. It was not possible to account 
for the deficit or surplus of these two vegetation types because PRODES (Brazil´s 
Federal government deforestation monitoring program for the Amazon) data do not 
include deforestation in cerrado and grassland areas, which is much harder to detect. 
The total area of cerrado or grassland mapped by PRODES was 1.8Mha or 8% of the 
total CAR analyzed area. We considered properties with cerrado or grassland areas 
larger than 50% of the property area as neutral (no deficit or surplus), to reduce the risk 
of bias. For those with less than 50% of cerrado or grassland we assumed that they were 
forested and applied the other criteria accordingly.   
 d) Legal Reserve in remaining areas: rural properties that were not eligible for 
any of the reduction conditions described above had their LR percentage defined as 
80% of each property area, according to the default LR requirement for the Amazon 
biome as established in the updated Brazilian Forest Code.  
 Deforestation data used to estimate LR deficit is based on the cumulative 
PRODES up to 2012 less the area of secondary forest detected by TerraClass (Brazil´s 
federal government land-use monitoring project for the Amazon) in the same area. The 
total forest area is the sum of forest detected by PRODES with the secondary forest 
detected by TerraClass (forest at advanced stage of regeneration) in areas previously 
detected as deforestation by PRODES. Deficits in APPs were not accounted for in this 
study due to the lack of a more detailed and reliable hydrography mapping (1:50.000) at 
the scale of Pará, required by Decree N° 7.830, 17 October 2012 for the National CAR 
System.  
 
2.2.3. Estimating compensation-only LR surplus and defining types of 
LR surplus 
We considered the following regulations of the Forest Code to estimate the 
surplus that is available for deficit compensation only (i.e. areas of forest that cannot be 
deforested): (i) for small properties or family holdings, any remaining native vegetation 
area under 80% of each property is considered as compensation-only surplus (Art. 44, 
§4); (ii) for medium and large properties that have forest cover greater than 50% and 
less than 80%, this range of forest cover is considered a compensation-only surplus 
where LR reduction is allowed (Art. 68, §2) (Figures 2, 3; Table S2).  
The number of opportunities provided by the Forest Code to compensate LR 
deficit makes it possible for properties to present, at the same time, a deficit (e.g. 
deforestation of native forest within LR after 22nd July 2008) and surplus for 
compensation (compensation-only surplus). For example, for the cases where LR 
reductions are allowed, a large property with 70% of forest cover in 2008, but where the 
landowner deforested an area of 10% after 2008, would present a LR deficit of 10%. 
But at the same time, the property presents a LR surplus of 10% that would be available 
to compensate the deficit of other properties, if the area is not embargoed, since forest 
cover of 50-80% of the property can be used to compensate LR deficit (Table S2). 
However, due to the persistent lack of clear regulations at the state level, many 
uncertainties remain regarding the application of compensation mechanism.   
The LR deforestable surplus is defined as areas of forest that are surplus to the 
legally required LR, and can therefore be legally deforested (forest cover over 80% of 
each property). This does not include areas of forest that are additional to the minimum 
cover stipulated by reduced compliance requirements in areas that have been 
historically deforested. For example, for medium and large properties in areas zoned for 
agricultural activities with more than 50% but less than 80% cover, the forest cover that 
is additional to 50% can be used to compensate for properties that are in deficit (termed 
compensation-only surplus), but cannot be deforested.  The total area of forest available 
for compensation schemes is the sum of the deforestable surplus and the compensation-
only surplus (termed here total surplus) (Table S2).  
 
3. RESULTS 
Of the total required Legal Reserve area in Pará (21.2 Mha), 10.7% (2.3 Mha) 
was classified as a LR deficit; 6.4% (1.3 Mha) as deforestable surplus and 53.1% (11.3 
Mha) as compensation-only surplus (Figures 4, 5 and Table S4). The remaining area is 
covered by forest that cannot be deforested or used for compensation. 
 
3.1. Distribution of Legal Reserve deficit in Pará  
A total of 23 Mha of CAR and 12 Mha of rural settlements were analyzed in this 
study, accounting for 29% of the surface area of Pará and 61% of its registerable area. 
The estimated total forest deficit in Pará covers 2.3 Mha and is made up by properties in 
CAR and rural settlements (Fig. 4a). The LR deficit in CAR corresponds to an area of 
~2 Mha (87% of the total deficit). The majority of this (50.4%) is within properties that 
have 0-30% deficit, while 48.2% is within properties that have 30-60% deficit and the 
remaining 1.4% for properties that have 60-80% deficit (Figure 4a; Table 1). 
Settlements were found to contain a deficit of 300,389 ha - about 13% of the total LR 
area requirement for this type of land tenure. Virtually all the LR deficit found in 
settlements (99.3%) corresponds to properties that have a deficit of less than 30%.  
 
Table 1: Legal Reserve (LR) deficit, deforestable surplus, compensation-only surplus,  
total surplus and Legal Reserve balance (
1
Surplus minus Deficit) in state of Pará by 
private property registered in the Environmental Rural Property Register (CAR) and 
rural settlements. Ajustar casas decimais na versão final. 
 










LR total surplus 
(ha) 
CAR 
0-30% 992,828 50.4 699,924         2,271,060          2,970,984  
30-60% 948,556 48.2 -            878,407             878,407  
60-80% 27,326 1.4 -            747,169             747,169  
80-100% - - -            173,446             173,446  
Total 1,968,710 100 699,924         4,070,082          4,770,006  
Rural 
settlements 
0-30% 298,297 99.3 656,762            375,984             375,984  
30-60% 1,047 0.3 -         1,266,943          1,266,943  
60-80% 1,046 0.3 -         3,801,909          1,227,423  
80-100% - - -         1,756,305          4,980,451  
Total 300,390 100 656,762         7,201,141          7,850,802  
Sum of totals 2,269,100 - 1,356,686       11,271,223        12,620,808  
LR Balance
1
 - - - -912,414         9,002,123        10,351,708  
 
 Figure 4: Distribution of Legal Reserve (as defined by the 2012 Brazilian Forest Code) 
in rural properties registered under CAR and settlements: a) deficit (forest cover under 
the required LR: negative values); b) deforestable surplus (forest cover over 80% of 
each property); c) compensation-only surplus (forest cover that can used for 
compensation purposes only but not deforested); d) total surplus (deforestable surplus 
and compensation-only surplus). 
 
3.2. Distribution of deforestable surplus and compensation-only 
surplus in Pará  
The deforestable surplus in Pará represents an area of 1.3 Mha (Figure 4b, Table 
1). The Marajó region alone holds 36% of the deforestable LR surplus for the state 
(Table S5).  The compensation-only surplus covers 11.2 Mha (Figure 4c, Table 1). 
From the total area of compensation-only surplus, 8.7 Mha (1.5 million from CAR and 
7.1 million from settlements) is relative to the current forest cover of small properties 
and 2.5 Mha from medium and large properties with 50% to 80% of forest cover. Thus, 
the total surplus estimated in this study, including deforestable surplus and 
compensation-only surplus, is 12.6 Mha (Figure 4d, Table 1). 
Accounting for both total surplus and total deficit the LR balance for the state 
gives a surplus of 10.3 Mha, due especially to the contribution of compensation-only 
surplus, which accounts  for 17% of the private land area available for CAR registry in 
Pará (Figure 4; Table 1). Conversely, taking into account only the deforestable surplus, 
the LR balance for Pará would give a deficit of 912,414 ha (Table 1). 
 
3.3. Distribution of Legal Reserve deficit and total surplus across 
properties of different sizes  
 Rural settlements account for the highest percentage of compensation-only 
surplus (96.7% - 7.2 Mha), as a percentage of the required LR area for this category, 
followed by the three classes of small properties (Figure 5a; Table S4). Settlements also 
presented the highest percentage of deforestable surplus (8.8% - 656,762 ha), followed 
by large and medium-sized properties. The LR deficit was mostly made up by medium 
(22.6% - 605,900 ha) and large (12.9% - 1.2 Mha) properties, followed by the three 
classes of small properties (Figure 5a; Table S4) (Figure 5b; Table S4). 
 Figure 5: Legal reserve balance by property size as (a) a percentage of the required LR 
and (b) total area in the in the state of Pará. Property size is defined in terms of the 
number of fiscal modules (FM).  
 
3.4. Distribution of Legal Reserve deficit and total surplus across 
municipalities 
The Legal Reserve of each of the 144 municipalities in the state of Pará was 
calculated as the total surplus (compensation-only surplus and deforestable surplus) 
minus the total deficit per municipality (Legal Reserve balance). We found that 32 
municipalities (22% of the state total) presented more deficit than surplus (Figure 6; 
Table S6) – amounting to a total of 382,521 ha, or 17% of the total deficit in private 
properties in Pará. In all cases the deficit of these 32 municipalities could be 
compensated for by the surplus provided by one or more neighboring municipalities, if 
the landowners do not restore forest on open land within the same municipality where 
the deficit occurred. The remaining 83%, or 1.8 Mha, of deficit that is distributed across 
111 (77% of the total) municipalities can be compensated within the same municipality 
if landowners choose not to restore on their own properties. Only one municipality 
(Santa Cruz do Arari) was mapped as neutral (no LR deficit or surplus) (Figure 6; Table 
S6). 
 Figure 6: Legal Reserve balance (Surplus minus Deficit) by municipality, as a 
percentage of the adjusted LR requirement for each municipality, according to the 
updated Brazilian Forest Code. Positive values indicate Legal Reserve surplus is higher 
than the deficit area and negative values indicate Legal Reserve deficit is higher than the 
surplus area. Zero indicates neutral municipalities (no deficit or surplus). 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Our estimate of the total LR surplus for the 35 Mha of registered properties 
(CAR and agrarian reform settlements - 58,835 properties) we assessed in Pará was 
more than five times the total area of deficit. Medium and large properties contributed 
the most to the total deficit area (22.6% and 12.9%, respectively), while agrarian reform 
settlements had comparatively large amounts of both compensation-only surplus and 
deforestable surplus. Of the municipalities that have properties in deficit, 111 could 
compensate their deficit with surplus areas within the same municipality while the 
remaining 32 could compensate from surplus areas in one or more of the neighboring 
municipalities, indicating that, in theory, compensation can always take place close to 
the source of the deficit. It is important to highlight that the vast majority (90%) of LR 
surplus we mapped in Pará is compensation-only surplus that cannot be legally 
deforested. Furthermore, the opportunities given to the landowners to reduce a deficit 
are flexible and this makes it difficult to define or predict the alternative compliance 
pathways (i.e. blends of on-farm restoration and compensation from different regions) 
that are likely to be adopted and therefore their implications for the conservation of 
remaining forests. 
 
4.1. Legal Reserve deficit and surplus across Pará  
The distribution of LR deficit and surplus in Pará is clearly related to the 
historical land-use and occupation process in the region. The largest concentration of 
LR deficit in the State is located in its southeast region (Figure 4a), mostly due to 
economic activities such as cattle ranching, practiced in the region since the 1970s when 
the Brazilian government encouraged immigration and deforestation to guarantee land 
tenure. Areas where the agricultural frontier is less advanced and with large 
conservation units (e.g. Calha-Norte, northwest of Pará), and/or low population density 
(like Marajó), in part due to the inaccessible nature of these regions, still retain large 
amounts of LR surplus (Figure 4a).  
The deficit and surplus found in agrarian settlements are associated with the 
nature of the settlements. For example, in Agro-Extractive Settlement Projects (PAE, in 
Portuguese) and Sustainable Development Settlements (PDS, in Portuguese), only low 
impact activities are allowed and represent the majority of the surplus area. In the 
Federal Settlements Project (PA, in Portuguese), agriculture and cattle ranching are the 
main activities (more associated with deforestation), and represent the majority of the 
deficit area (Figure 4a). 
The total LR surplus of Pará, when taking account of both deforestable and 
compensation-only surplus, is more than five times the total area of deficit in the state. 
This suggests that the total surplus of Pará could compensate for its entire deficit (2.3 
Mha) with 10.3 Mha still left over that can be traded with states within the same biome, 
for example, Mato Grosso, a neighboring state that has also experienced high historical 
rates of deforestation. This means that properties interested in trading LR surplus could, 
in theory, be located in areas that are ecologically very dissimilar or in different 
biogeographic regions. It is therefore important to understand the extent to which 
achieving legal compliance with the Forest Code through off-farm compensation is 
possible within the same or neighboring municipalities compared to more distant areas.   
The fact that the LR surplus in Pará is made up almost entirely of forest areas 
that cannot be legally deforested has three important implications. The first is that the 
trading of these forests to compensate for illegal deforestation elsewhere brings no 
additional conservation benefit in and of itself. This is in contrast to the case of 
deforestable surplus that, if protected, could prevent primary forest from being cleared. 
The second is that these forests could provide a welcome income stream for farmers 
who have historically been more law abiding – including many smallholders. Finally, 
there is very little incentive for restoration activities, even in areas important for 
endemic biodiversity, or areas where the supply of ecosystem services is severely 
diminished. Given that when allowed by law (i.e. they have more than 80% forest 
cover) landowners still have more incentives to clear forest than rent deforestable land 
for compensation purposes, LR deficits are likely to be resolved through 
compensation-only surplus unless new incentives or conditions are created to 
encourage the protection of deforestable surplus through legal reserve trading.  
 
4.2. Achieving legal compliance across actors and municipalities and 
maximising returns for conservation 
The distribution of LR deficits and surpluses varies across properties of different sizes 
and between municipalities. Understanding this variability is key to assessing the 
potential for different actors to achieve legal compliance and hence the most appropriate 
mix of policy measures and incentives to ensure that regulations are enforced effectively 
and fairly (Godar et al., 2014). The relative contribution of total surplus and 
compensation-only surplus was greater for small properties and settlements; and the 
contribution of deforestable surplus was higher for rural settlements, suggesting that 
some of the poorest landowners would be able to receive an important income stream 
from landowners in deficit. This high proportion of compensation-only surplus in small 
properties can be partly explained by the fact that all current vegetation in small 
properties can be used to compensate deficit, compared to medium and large properties 
where only the portion of forest cover that is between 50-80% of each property can be 
used for the same purpose. In addition, smallholder-dominated areas generally contain 
more forest than areas dominated by large landowners who are more likely to engage in 
extensive cattle ranching and large-scale agriculture, and forests in smallholder 
dominated areas are usually less fragmented and degraded (Godar et al., 2014).  
Under the updated Forest Code landowners have a range of options to reduce LR 
deficit, including: (i) the opportunity to compensate a deficit anywhere, as long as it is 
within the same biome where deficit occurred; (ii) use of both native vegetation and 
secondary forest in any stage of regeneration for compensation purposes; and (iii) 
restoration of forest on the farm which has the deficit instead of compensating in other 
places. These broad ranges of options have very different consequences for biodiversity 
conservation.  
At the municipality scale, despite the 2.3 Mha of LR deficit found in Pará, 77% 
of the municipalities (111) can compensate all of their deficit – amounting to 83% of the 
total deficit of the state in private properties- within the same municipality. This 
provides an important opportunity for the government to guide (whether through 
regulation or incentives) compensation and restoration actions to remain within the 
same municipality in order to maintain locally important ecosystem services and 
strengthen the conservation of regionally endemic and often endangered biodiversity. 
Furthermore, promoting legal reserve trading between neighboring municipalities can 
reduce the transaction costs of matching supply and demand for ad hoc agreements – 
which are likely to dominate LR compensation mechanisms until a mature market 
system is in place. Nevertheless, 22% of the municipalities (32) have no choice but to 
compensate their LR deficit in other municipalities, owing to the lack of surplus locally. 
This deficit corresponds to 17% of the total deficit found in Pará, and in such cases it 
will be important to incentivize compensation within the same biogeographic regions. 
Thus, efforts should be made to first ensure the protection of existing 
biodiversity and avoid further deforestation, and then to mitigate and compensate for 
impacts that have already occurred (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Bull et al., 2013). 
Maximising the environmental benefits of achieving Forest Code compliance requires 
measures and considerations that go beyond the existing legal framework. These 
include (i) conservation of deforestable surplus, even where forests are degraded. To 
improve the potential conservation dividends from the compensation-only surplus the 
government could use the compensation regulatory system as a mechanism to avoid 
further deforestation of standing forests, e.g. through clear incentives or conditions to 
prioritize compensation with the remaining deforestable surplus; (ii) promotion of local 
compensation wherever possible. The net effects of achieving legal compliance through 
offsets that are not like for like (e.g. compensating in areas where the species 
composition is different) will result in an overall loss of biodiversity, particularly as the 
regions with the highest deficit lie within some of the most threatened areas of 
endemism, such as Belém, which contains more threatened species than anywhere else 
in the Brazilian Amazon (Moura et al., 2014); (iii) encourage avoidance of forest 
degradation and restoration actions in areas that are severely degraded. In addition to 
conservation actions to protect forest from being degraded, there could be advantages of 
encouraging local forest restoration in municipalities that would otherwise have to 
compensate remotely. This would help guarantee a reduction in forest fragmentation 
and an overall gain in ecological connectivity and habitat for forest species in the 
medium/long term.  
 
4.3. Technical challenges and barriers to addressing the Legal Reserve 
deficit in Pará 
A number of technical challenges must be addressed in order to obtain reliable 
assessments of environmental liabilities, facilitate law enforcement, monitoring and 
ensure that legal reserve deficits are fully and appropriately compensated. First, more 
accurate and representative georeferenced register of private properties (CAR) are 
required in the Amazon region. Despite the fact that the state of Pará is the most 
advanced Brazilian state in registering its private properties in the CAR system 
(Whately and Campanili, 2013), many municipalities present large areas of unregistered 
private lands, such as Cametá (97%) and Barcarena (93%) (Green Municipalities 
Program and Government of the state of Pará, 2013). Furthermore, the Secretary of 
State for the Environment estimates that only 4,000 of approximately 100,000 
properties registered in CAR in the state have been validated on the ground (Ausier, 
2013). Thus, the CAR database presents many uncertainties regarding overlapping 
property boundaries, and the definition of legal reserve areas, productive land and 
APPs. For this reason, our analysis of existing CAR data may present potential issues 
with representativeness across the State, especially in the western region that 
encompasses most municipalities with CAR cover <50%, and is therefore likely to be 
the least representative coverage. However, this region also has the highest portion of 
protected areas and lowest deforestation pressure due to accessibility. We therefore  
believe that, even if the whole registerable area was mapped, the pattern of distribution 
of deficit and surpluses would not change significantly across the State. 
Second, the accuracy of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and remote 
sensing products are limited by the quality (or lack) of mapping data, especially in the 
Amazon region (Silva et al., 2013). Is this study we have not estimated deficit in APPs 
due to the lack of detailed (1:50.000) and reliable hydrological maps for Pará, which are 
required by law in Brazil (Decree N° 7.830, 17 October 2012 for the National CAR 
System). Moreover, official data on land use and land cover for the Amazon are not 
always accurate, despite being the best available source of information at large spatial 
scales. We have estimated an area of 1 Mha detected by TerraClass as deforestation in 
2008 and as secondary forest in 2010. In a 2-year-window it is unlikely that 
regenerating forests can be classified as secondary forest, as defined by the TerraClass 
systems as forests at an advanced stage of regeneration (Embrapa and INPE, 2011),  
implying a potential overestimate of secondary forest data. The age of secondary forest 
is important for law enforcement, because different ages of forest require different 
licenses for cleaning or deforestation (i.e. forests older than five years can be protected 
from deforestation, depending on its structure) (Normative Instruction N° 08, 03 
November 2015). 
Finally, the complexity of Brazilian environmental laws have led to 
misunderstandings and controversies among different sectors (for example government, 
NGOs and farmers) on how to enforce the law and estimate legal liabilities (LR and 
APP deficits) (Ellinger and Barreto, 2012; Vale et al., 2014). Such controversies have 
resulted in legal actions from the Federal Prosecutor's Office against several articles of 
the Forest Code (Federal Prosecutor’s Office, 2014).  
It is important to note that Forest Code states that if deforestation occurred 
during a time when the law required a lower level of LR, then the land owners are 
exempt to restore or compensate forest if they complied with the legislation in force at 
the time (Art. 68). However, due to the lack of any property database for the past 
decades, these cases were not considered in the analysis. To benefit from this clause, the 
land owner must prove to the state Environmental Secretary the existence and size of 
the property at the time it was governed by a lower LR requirement. Although this is 
impossible to assess based on information that is currently available, we do not believe 
this limitation would change the overall results of this paper, since this rule is mostly 
applicable to regions where 80% of LR is required, which is a fairly small area (~8% of 
the state). 
For a more complete diagnosis of LR deficit in the State, as required by law, 
more detailed mapping and assessment of APPs is essential to estimate the potential for 
forest restoration in Pará. Considering that the LR deficit in Pará could be completely 
compensated by compensation-only surplus areas, and the little (or lack) of incentive to 
retire areas of productive land or restore forests in the LR, restoration activities can be 
expected to be more focused in APPs, where it is mandatory, compared to LRs where it 
is voluntary. However, it is currently not possible to evaluate to what extent forests will 
be compensated or restored to achieve compliance with the Forest Code.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
While Brazil has one of the most complex and advanced set of environmental 
laws, our results are relevant to the governance of forests on private lands in many other 
tropical forests nations. Wherever environmental laws require landowners to maintain a 
certain amount of forest cover, there are regulations regarding forest deficit or surplus 
that must be understood, and the implications of this balance for forest management at 
both local and large scales needs therefore to be assessed. In this study, we show that 
there was a significant LR surplus that is five times the deficit estimated in the state, 
despite the historical development of agriculture frontiers in Pará. That said the amount 
of forest available for compensation can only be considered a potential surplus because 
it is impossible say to what extent landowners will opt to compensate or restore to 
resolve the deficit of individual properties. 
To maximize the conservation benefits of efforts to achieve compliance with the 
Forest Code additional measures are needed that are outside the existing legal 
framework. These include: the use of incentives or regulations to prioritize off-farm 
compensation in properties that still retain a deforestable surplus; encouraging off-farm 
compensation to happen as locally as possible to guarantee the protection of 
biodiversity in ecologically similar forests to those where the deficit occurs; and 
encouraging restoration of forests in areas where remnant forests are highly fragmented 
, as well as additional conservation actions to encourage avoidance of degradation in 
areas that are not under threat of deforestation but stand to be severely degraded from 
the impacts of logging and fire.   
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We thank the Porticus Fundation and World Resources Institute for supporting this 
research. We also thank Imazon team, especially Brenda Brito for support in the 
analysis. This is publication #48 of the Sustainable Amazon Network publication series. 
 
References 
Ausier, M. (2013). SEMA-PA. Personal information. 
Barreto, P., Pinto, A., Brito, B. and Hayashi, S. (2008). Quem é o dono da Amazônia?: 
uma análise do recadastramento de imóveis rurais. Belém, Pará: Imazon. 72p. 
Brazilian Federal Government. (2012a). Decree N° 7,830 from 17 October 2012. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-
2014/2012/Decreto/D7830.htm. 
Brazilian Federal Government. (2012b). Federal Law n° 12,651, from 25 May 2012. 
[Online]. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-
2014/2012/Lei/L12727.htm. 
Brazilian Ministry of the Environment and National Indian Foundation. (2013). 
Protected areas in state of Pará. Personal communication. 
Brito, B. and Barreto, P. (2011). A regularização fundiária avançou na Amazônia?: os 
dois anos do programa Terra Legal. Belém, Pará: Imazon. 71p. 
Bull, J. W., Suttle, K. B., Gordon, A., Singh, N. J. and Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2013). 
Biodiversity offsets in theory and practice. Oryx, 47 (03), p.369–380. [Online]. 
Available at: doi:10.1017/S003060531200172X. 
Daily, G. C., Alexander, S., Ehrlich, P. R., Goulder, L., Lubchenco, J., Matson, P. A., 
Mooney, H. A., Postel, S., Schneider, S. H. and Tilman, D. (1997). Ecosystem services: 
benefits supplied to human societies by natural ecosystems, Issues in Ecology. 2nd ed. 
USA: Ecological Society of America. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.esa.org/science_resources/issues/TextIssues/issue2.php [Accessed: 24 June 
2013]. 
Ellinger, P. and Barreto, P. (2012). Código Florestal: como sair do impasse? 
Publicação, Belém, Pará: Imazon. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.imazon.org.br/publicacoes/outros/codigo-florestal-como-sair-do-impasse 
[Accessed: 16 September 2014]. 
Embrapa and INPE. (2011). Levantamento de informações de uso e cobertura da terra 
na Amazônia. 
Federal Prosecutor’s Office. (2014). Justiça Federal declara inconstitucionalidade de 
artigo do novo Código Florestal. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.prmg.mpf.mp.br/imprensa/noticias/meio-ambiente/copy_of_justica-federal-
declara-inconstitucionalidade-de-artigo-do-novo-codigo-florestal. 
Ferreira, J., Pardini, R., Metzger, J. P., Fonseca, C. R., Pompeu, P. S., Sparovek, G. and 
Louzada, J. (2012). Towards environmentally sustainable agriculture in Brazil: 
challenges and opportunities for applied ecological research: Towards sustainable 
agriculture in Brazil. Journal of Applied Ecology, 49, p.535–541. [Online]. Available at: 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2664.2012.02145.x. 
Godar, J., Gardner, T. A., Tizado, E. J. and Pacheco, P. (2014). Actor-specific 
contributions to the deforestation slowdown in the Brazilian Amazon. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, p.201322825. [Online]. Available at: 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1322825111. 
Green Municipalities Program. (2014). CAR no Estado. [Online]. Available at: 
http://municipiosverdes.com.br/ [Accessed: 11 February 2015]. 
Green Municipalities Program and Government of the state of Pará. (2013). Dados 
recentes. Green Municipalities Program. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.municipiosverdes.com.br/relatorios/seleciona_tema/ficha_tematica 
[Accessed: 26 December 2013]. 
Grimaldi, M., Oszwald, J., Dolédec, S., Hurtado, M. del P., Miranda, I. de S., Sartre, X. 
A. de, Assis, W. S. de, Castañeda, E., Desjardins, T., Dubs, F., Guevara, E., Gond, V., 
Lima, T. T. S., Marichal, R., Michelotti, F., Mitja, D., Noronha, N. C., Oliveira, M. N. 
D., Ramirez, B., Rodriguez, G., Sarrazin, M., Jr, M. L. da S., Costa, L. G. S., Souza, S. 
L. de, Veiga, I., Velasquez, E. and Lavelle, P. (2014). Ecosystem services of regulation 
and support in Amazonian pioneer fronts: searching for landscape drivers. Landscape 
Ecology, 29 (2), p.311–328. [Online]. Available at: doi:10.1007/s10980-013-9981-y. 
IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. (2013). Pecuária - 
Efetivos/Rebanhos. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/pecua/default.asp?t=2&z=t&o=24&u1=1&u3=1&u4=
1&u5=1&u6=1&u7=1&u2=15 [Accessed: 28 July 2015]. 
IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. (2014). Estados. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.ibge.gov.br/estadosat/perfil.php?sigla=pa [Accessed: 22 
January 2014]. 
Landau, E., Cruz, R., Hirsch, A., Pimenta, F. and Guimarães, D. (2012). Variação 
geográfica do tamanho dos módulos fiscais no Brasil. Embrapa. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.infoteca.cnptia.embrapa.br/bitstream/doc/949260/1/doc146.pdf [Accessed: 
3 March 2013]. 
McKenney, B. A. and Kiesecker, J. M. (2010). Policy Development for Biodiversity 
Offsets: A Review of Offset Frameworks. Environmental Management, 45 (1), p.165–
176. [Online]. Available at: doi:10.1007/s00267-009-9396-3. 
MMA - Brazilian Ministry of the Environment. (2004). Plano de ação para a 
prevenção e controle de desmatamento. Brasília. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/FundoAmazonia/export/sites/default/site_pt/Galerias
/Arquivos/Publicacoes/PPCDAM.pdf. 
Moura, N. G., Lees, A. C., Aleixo, A., Barlow, J., Dantas, S. M., Ferreira, J., Lima, M. 
D. F. C. and Gardner, T. A. (2014). Two Hundred Years of Local Avian Extinctions in 
Eastern Amazonia. Conservation Biology, 28 (5), p.1271–1281. [Online]. Available at: 
doi:10.1111/cobi.12300. 
Nasi, R., Wunder, S. and Campos, J. J. (2002). Forest ecosystem services: can they pay 
our way out of deforestation? New York: CIFOR, p.38. [Online]. Available at: 
http://scholar.google.com.br/scholar?hl=en&as_vis=1&q=forest+ecosystem+services&
btnG=&as_sdt=1%2C5&as_sdtp= [Accessed: 24 June 2013]. 
Silva, P. H. A., Felix, I. M., Zacari, Milhomens, A., Menke, A., Oliveira, M. and Souza 
Jr, C. (2013). Desenvolvimento e implementação de metodologia para a automação e 
melhoria do  processo de monitoramento e gestão de Áreas de Preservação Permanente 
ao longo  dos cursos d’água para apoio ao Cadastro Ambiental Rural. In: Anais XVI 
Simpósio Brasileiro de Sensoriamento Remoto - SBSR, Foz do Iguaçu, PR, Brasil, 2013, 
Foz do Iguaçu, Paraná, Brazil: INPE, p.6861–6868. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.dsr.inpe.br/sbsr2013/files/p1016.pdf. 
Soares-Filho, B., Rajão, R., Macedo, M., Carneiro, A., Costa, W., Coe, M., Rodrigues, 
H. and Alencar, A. (2014). Cracking Brazil’s Forest Code. Science, 344 (6182), p.363–
364. [Online]. Available at: doi:10.1126/science.1246663. 
Soares-Filho, B. S. (2013). Impacto da revisão do Código Florestal: como viabilizar o 
grande desafio adiante? Brasília: Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, p.28. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.sae.gov.br/site/wp-content/uploads/Artigo-codigo-
florestal.pdf. 
Souza Jr., C., Amaral, P., Sales, M., Salomão, R., Oliveira Jr., L., Batista, W. and 
Martins, J. (2013). Base de informações geográficas para gestão ambiental municipal na 
Amazônia. Revista Brasileira de Cartografia, 3, p.591–603. 
State Environmental Secretary. (2015). Personal information. 
Vale, R., Lima, A. and Pinto, F. (2014). Muito dito e pouco feito. Observatório do 
Código Florestal. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.observatorioflorestal.org.br/?p=1446. 
Vieira, I. C. G., Gardner, T., Ferreira, J., Lees, A. C. and Barlow, J. (2014). Challenges 
of Governing Second-Growth Forests: A Case Study from the Brazilian Amazonian 
State of Pará. Forests, 5 (7), p.1737–1752. [Online]. Available at: 
doi:10.3390/f5071737. 
Whately, M. and Campanili, M. (2013). Green Municipalities Program: lessons learned 
and challenges for 2013/2014. Belém, Pará: Green Municipalities Program and Pará 
state Government. [Online]. Available at: 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4LOtiMjnDend1VyZzJXNnRyRlk/edit. 
Zakia, M. J. and Pinto, L. (2013). Guia para a aplicação da nova lei florestal em 
propriedades rurais. Piracicaba, SP: Imaflora. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.imaflora.org/downloads/biblioteca/52d7c3a819c3e_Guia_Aplicao_Nova_L
ei_Florestal.pdf. 
 
 
